https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/issue/feedBotswana Notes and Records2026-03-05T10:07:55+00:00Open Journal Systems<p>Botswana Studies</p>https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2630Cover and Front Matter2026-03-05T10:07:55+00:00Fred Mortonfred.morton@home.co.bw<p>This section provides information on the Botswana Society and the current volume of the Botswana Notes and Records which focuses on the historic 2024 general election.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2631The 2024 Elections in Botswana: Introduction to the Special Issue2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Jeremy Seekingsjeremy.seekings@gmail.comChristian John Makgalamakgalac@ub.ac.bwBatlang SeaboSeabob@UB.AC.BW<p>On 30 October 2024, Batswana voted in the country’s thirteenth parliamentary and district council elections since Independence in 1966. The result was the unprecedented defeat of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which had governed Botswana since before Independence, and the formation of a new government by the hitherto opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The BDP was not merely defeated but was also crushed, with its share of the vote dropping by more than twenty percentage points in comparison to the previous elections, in 2019. The BDP won only four (out of 61) parliamentary seats and 130 (out of 609) district council seats. It was relegated from being the ruling party to being the smallest of the opposition parties in Parliament. It also lost its control over local government. Before the elections, it controlled almost all of the 31 local councils. After the elections, it controlled only one (very small) council (Chobe).</p>2026-03-04T12:37:26+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2632Vision Delayed? The BNF’s Uneasy Path to Unity in Action2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Jeff Ramsayjefframsaybots@gmail.com<p>In 2024, the Botswana National Front (BNF) was elected to power as the leading partner within the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). Founded in 1965, the same year the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) first assumed power, the BNF had been Botswana’s leading opposition movement for most of its history. The Front’s failure to come to power earlier can be attributed to its inability to achieve its coalition-building ambitions before its 2012 affiliation with the UDC. In this respect, the ultimate triumph of the UDC has been hailed as a delayed realisation of the BNF’s original mission to remove the BDP from power through a revolutionary multi-organisational front. However, time will tell to what extent the UDC government will live up to the egalitarian ideals espoused by the BNF’s founders.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2633The Decline and Aftermath of BDP Partisanship in Botswana2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Batlang Seaboseabob@ub.ac.bwJeremy Seekingsjeremy.seekings@gmail.com<p>The collapse in the popular vote for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in the 2024 elections resulted from short-, medium- and long-term factors. Over the long term, there had been a dramatic decline in the proportion of the electorate who identified with the party. As recently as the early 2000s, Afrobarometer found that about one half of surveyed Batswana said that they felt close to the BDP. This share dropped to about one-fifth by the 2020s. A small part of this was due to generational replacement, as the earlier (and more loyal) generation counted for a smaller and smaller share of the electorate. Most of the decline in BDP partisanship was due to diminishing support within older generations. Some aspects of social and economic change – including urbanisation and the declining significance of agriculture – may have contributed to this. Most of the decline in identification with the BDP was due, however, to worsening assessments of the performance of the party and its leaders. The decline of BDP partisanship means that election outcomes have come to be determined by the votes of non-partisan or independent voters, i.e. voters who do not feel close to the BDP or any of the (then) opposition parties. In the 2020s, few of these non-partisans are swayed by regional, ethnic, or other ‘sociological’ factors. Voting intentions among the rising number of non-partisans correlate with these voters’ assessments of the performance of the president and government and how much they trust the BDP and opposition parties, i.e. with medium-term factors. With reasonable assumptions about short-term effects on turnout and voting preferences, we can simulate the actual 2024 election results.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2634The Legacy of Professor Kenneth Good and the Impact of the 2021–2024 Constitutional Review Debacle on Botswana’s 2024 Elections2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Christian John Makgalamakgalac@mopipi.ub.bwMonageng Mogalakwemogalakwex@gmail.com<p>Namibia and South Africa adopted new democratic constitutions in 1990 and 1996 respectively, thereby overshadowing Botswana, which had been regarded as Africa’s leading example of democracy. During the 2019 election campaign, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) pledged to conduct a comprehensive constitutional review in response to long-standing public grievances about the country’s growing socio-economic and political issues. However, after winning the elections, the party seemed unwilling to fulfil this promise. In December 2021, President Mokgweetsi Masisi yielded to popular pressure for a constitutional review. His controversial approach involved him appointing a Presidential Commission on the Review of the Constitution, defining its terms of reference, and selecting the commissioners. This approach served the narrow self-interest of the ruling elite and the BDP, but the commission’s findings were rejected by civil society and opposition parties. Civil society, including church groups, even threatened litigation if the government did not withdraw its Constitution (Amendment) Bill No. 4 of 2024. This paper uses qualitative research to argue that Masisi’s approach gives credence to Professor Kenneth Good’s view of Botswana as an authoritarian liberal and minimalist democracy, where the ruling elites are accountable only to themselves. Consequently, this approach has perpetuated a ‘strong man’ syndrome and weak institutions, leading to the continued marginalisation of some sectors of society. The BDP’s significant loss of power in the 2024 elections, after 58 years, can be understood in this context.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2635Enhancing Democratic Integrity in Botswana: Citizen Perceptions on Electoral Transparency, Universal Suffrage, and Oversight in the Electoral Processes2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Mogopodi Lekorwelekorwem@ub.ac.bwWilford Molefemolefewb@ub.ac.bw<p>This paper investigates public perceptions of electoral integrity in Botswana, by focusing on three key aspects of the democratic process: transparency in vote counting at polling stations, the enfranchisement of prisoners, and the oversight role of political party agents in voter registration. Drawing on survey data and qualitative evidence analysis, the study assesses citizen attitudes towards these proposed reforms, and the implications of such reforms for enhancing transparency, inclusivity, and accountability within Botswana’s electoral framework. Findings indicate overwhelming support for conducting vote counting at polling stations to strengthen transparency and public confidence in election outcomes. Conversely, opinions on prisoner voting rights are polarised, with greater support observed in rural areas where voting is viewed as integral to rehabilitation and democratic inclusion. The participation of political party agents in voter registration received moderate endorsement, tempered by concerns about potential partisanship, particularly among urban respondents. The study concludes that advancing democratic integrity in Botswana requires reinforcing transparency mechanisms, promoting civic education, and fostering inclusive dialogue on electoral reform. The findings contribute to broader debates on democratic consolidation and electoral governance in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2636Botswana’s 2024 Elections: The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Under Public Surveillance and Scrutiny2026-03-04T18:20:34+00:00Bontle Tumediso MasiloMasilo@UB.AC.BWSonia Gaobolaesoniagaobolae.bcpi@gmail.com<p>All national elections held in Botswana since Independence have been declared free and fair. Despite positive evaluations of Botswana elections over the years, public trust in the Botswana Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the institution tasked with the administration of elections in Botswana, has been declining. In the period leading to the 2024 elections, opposition parties raised concerns about possible rigging and manipulation of the election process in favour of the ruling party. This paper examines public trust in the IEC in the period leading to the 2024 elections. It argues that the IEC attracted considerable public scrutiny because of declining public trust in the IEC and other government institutions and general dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy in Botswana.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2637Generational Changes in Political Attitudes in Botswana, 1999–20242026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Carla Grahlcarlagrahl@icloud.comJeremy Seekingsjeremy.seekings@gmail.com<p>Successive elections have different outcomes because individual voters themselves change their preferences (often because of shifts in what parties and candidates have to offer) and the electorate changes as older voters die and adolescents reach voting age (i.e. ‘generational replacement’). This paper examines the contributions to the decline in support for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) made by changing preferences and the changing electorate, using survey data for the twenty-five years from 1999 to 2024. In some respects, the preferences and attitudes of successive generations of voters have changed in very similar ways, with more and more negative assessments of the performance of the BDP and its leadership. In other respects, however, there are clear generational differences rooted in their formative socialisation in different periods: The generation of Batswana born before Independence were (and remain) significantly more attached to the BDP than the following generations. These are differences between generations, not simply by age or stage in the life cycle. Evidence from focus groups suggests that generational differences are in part due to urbanisation: Voters who migrated to towns or who grew up in towns were exposed to different influences than voters who remained in the villages of rural Botswana were. Historical loyalties rooted in early political socialisation are important, but the loyalties of many urban and some rural voters have been transformed by more contemporary experiences and assessments.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2638Rise of Gen Z Voters: Voter Turnout in Botswana’s 2024 General Election2026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Batlang Seaboseabob@ub.ac.bwBame R Gaonyadiwebameromeogaonyadiwe@gmail.com<p>Botswana’s 2024 general election resulted in the country’s first-ever change of power from the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to the opposition coalition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The elections were also significant due to a considerably high voter turnout, despite a slight decline from the 2019 general election. Voter apathy and low voter turnout during elections have been pointed out as some of the weaknesses of Botswana’s electoral democracy. Besides many other causes of voter apathy, a history of one-party dominance has been identified as contributing to voter apathy, as studies found that many people, especially young people, do not participate because of the domination of the BDP. As a result, some scholars concluded that the long-time ruling BDP dominated elections because of the support the party enjoyed from older generations. However, following the historic defeat of the BDP by the UDC, one might wonder if there are significant changes in the demographic composition of voters in the 2024 general election. Based on this premise, this paper analyses voter turnout in the 2024 general election. Using electoral data from the Independent Electoral Commission, the paper compares voter registration and turnout in the different age cohorts. Afrobarometer data and secondary sources are also relied upon to investigate the influence of three theoretical factors: party identification, rational choice, and sociological theories. This paper argues that there was a rise in young and first-time voters in the 2024 general election, and this cohort of voters influenced the election outcomes by voting for the UDC, as its message resonated with this cohort of voters. The findings of the paper hold significant implications for Batswana’s voting behaviour, elections, and the future of Botswana’s democracy.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2639Challenges to Women’s Participation in Politics: The Case of Female Candidates in the 2024 General Election in Botswana2026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Dorothy Mpabangampabanga@ub.ac.bwGodisang Mookodimookodi@ub.ac.bwAngela Joubertangelajoubert5@gmail.comSethunya Mosimemosimest@ub.ac.bw<p>Only three women won in the 61 parliamentary constituencies for the thirteenth Parliament. This paper examines gender stereotypes in digital media as one of the factors behind the gender gap in parliamentary representation. Through content analysis, the paper explores challenges faced by women candidates during the 2024 general election; a mixed methodology entailed desk-based research using documented sources, and online sources including social media. The major themes that emerged were patriarchy and stereotyping of female candidates whereby men were viewed as leaders whilst women should stay at home to look after the household. Some of the posts doubted women’s capabilities and potential for success once elected to office. Empowerment policies and initiatives were blamed for women’s alleged expectations of the reward of political office without having earned it. A minority of online posts were, however, positive; they viewed female candidates as intelligent, hardworking, accountable, and capable of running government. Women’s participation in politics is hindered by patriarchy, stereotypes, and unsupportive structures and policies. Cultural patriarchy results in the stereotyping of women candidates, such that men were viewed as leaders in public spheres and women were viewed as best suited for the private domestic sphere in society.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2640Ke Nako? The Modest Success of the Botswana Patriotic Front in the (Former) Central District of Botswana, 2019–20242026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Jeremy Seekingsjeremy.seekings@gmail.com<p>One factor in the collapse of support for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was the challenge posed by the breakaway Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) in the former Central District. The BPF had been formed by the kgosikgolo of the Bamangwato and the former president of Botswana, Ian Khama, in 2019, just prior to that year’s elections. This article reviews the performance of the BPF from its formation in 2019 through to the 2024 elections. In the 2019 elections, the newly formed BPF had performed strongly in the Khama heartland of Serowe, but, in most other Central District constituencies, Khama and the BPF supported candidates from other opposition parties against the BDP. In the 2024 election, the BPF ran more and generally stronger candidates but made only limited progress by winning only five parliamentary seats (two more than in 2019) and forty district council seats (23 more than in 2019). The BFP’s share of the vote across the (from 2022, former) Central District was smaller than those of the Umbrella for Democratic Change, the BDP and the Botswana Congress Party. The BPF relied heavily on Khama’s legitimacy and aggressive campaigning. The party lacked strong organisation on the ground. The BPF’s decision to compete against other opposition parties might have weakened the BDP, but it limited the BPF’s own gains. In many constituencies, voters who were unhappy with the BDP supported the other opposition parties rather than the BPF.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2641Electoral History and Turnover Tradition in Botswana’s Outlier Constituency of Kgatleng West2026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Christian John Makgalamakgalac@mopipi.ub.bw<p>Botswana is regarded as Africa’s oldest surviving multiparty democracy, yet constituency-based studies have been rare until 2024. This paper examines Kgatleng West, one of three constituencies in Kgatleng District, which is notable for its turnover of parliamentary representatives from various parties since the first elections in 1965. The victory of the opposition Botswana Congress Party in Kgatleng West in 2024 means that the constituency has been represented by five different parties; a rare victory by a woman candidate adds a gender dimension. While tribal royalty has influenced voter choice, Bakgatla are traditionally independent-minded. Kgosikgolo Kgafela II, who was enthroned in 2008, even called for Kgatleng’s independence. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which ruled from 1966 to 2024, won only four constituencies in 2024, including Kgatleng East. Wiseman, in his study in Kgatleng in 1978, framed its politics around conflicts and alliances involving tribal leader Kgosikgolo Linchwe II, the BDP, and the opposition Botswana Peoples Party. This paper analyses Kgatleng voters’ fickleness, by examining the dynamics of conflict and shifting alliances among the BDP, Bakgatla royalty, and opposition parties across all 13 election cycles up to 2024. The paper provides background on party politics and elections in Kgatleng, with a focus on Kgatleng West’s candidate selection, campaign strategies, and challenges for the 2024 elections, and an analysis of the election results for parliamentary and council candidates. The paper concludes that, despite being deeply rooted in the country’s electoral culture, traditional campaigning strategies like motorcades, political rallies, distribution of free party-apparel, and town hall debates do not guarantee electoral success for the most visible or aggressive party. Furthermore, the dynamics of conflict and shifting alliances are such that the imposition of candidates by the national party hierarchy, without consideration of local dynamics, can be counterproductive, as seen in Kgatleng East and Kgatleng West for the Umbrella for Democratic Change.</p>2026-03-04T00:00:00+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##https://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/view/2642The Elections in Shoshong, 2024: The Consequences of Defection2026-03-04T18:20:35+00:00Jeremy Seekingsjeremy.seekings@gmail.com<p>The 2024 elections in Shoshong offer an opportunity to examine how the defection of an elected member of Parliament (MP) from an opposition to the ruling party affects the local political landscape. Shoshong was a long-standing ruling party stronghold until 2019, when the parliamentary seat and a majority of the district council wards were won for the first time by the opposition coalition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). Less than three years later, the MP defected from the opposition to the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). None of the senior UDC office-holders or elected councillors in the constituency followed him. This appears to have accentuated the usual conflicts within parties (especially the ruling BDP) over candidate selection – and then who supported who in the run-up to the subsequent elections. In the 2024 elections, the UDC maintained its domination of the constituency by winning seven out of nine council seats as well as the parliamentary seat, thereby ousting the defector. But the UDC’s share of the council vote in 2024 was marginally lower than in 2019 and its share of the parliamentary vote was lower. Whilst the poor performance of the BDP was in large part due to factors exogenous to the constituency, particularly the countrywide resurgence of the UDC and the expansion of the BPF, it seems unlikely that the defector took many supporters with him. In this constituency, in these elections, party proved more important than the individual candidate.</p>2026-03-04T17:52:31+00:00##submission.copyrightStatement##